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KIERKEGAARD AND NATURAL REASON:
A CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER
Jack Mulder, Jr.

In this paper I consider Kierkegaard's pseudonymous attack on natural the
ology with respect to how it lines up with Catholic thought on that topic. I
argue that Kierkegaard's recently shown similarities to accounts of basic be
liefs raise an interesting question when a Catholic hybrid of basic beliefs and
natural theology, which I develop in the paper, is considered. Kierkegaard
does not attack what we might call natural reason, or a natural awareness of
God's existence, only natural theology's demonstrative capabilities, and his
reasons for doing the latter, in our current epistemological climate, are shown
to be mistaken.

Many a man will live and die upon a dogma:
no man will be a martyr for a conclusion.1
—John Henry Cardinal Newman

1. Introduction
Kierkegaard scholarship of recent years has been at very great pains to
dismiss the charge, classically laid upon Kierkegaard, of fideism.*2 Quite
independently, fideism stands, in the tradition of the Catholic Church,3
as a heretical extreme of which so-called rationalism is the other pole.4
Mhap. 4, section 3, An Essay in Aid o f a Grammar o f Assent (Notre Dame: Univer
sity of Notre Dame Press, 2006), p. 89.
2Terence Penelhum's book, God and Skepticism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983), though
hardly without independent merit, treats Kierkegaard as a fideist. More recently,
Linda Zagzebski (Philosophy o f Religion: An Historical Introduction [Oxford: Black
well, 2007]) claims that Kierkegaard is a "radical fideist," a viewpoint that she
associates with the claim that "faith is not only higher than reason, it is opposed to
it" (p. 59). Kierkegaard's extravagant style provides plenty of grist for the mill, but
scholarship of recent years, in my view, has shown that Kierkegaard's considered
view cannot be understood in this way.
3In this paper, I will often use "the Church" as shorthand for "the Roman Cath
olic Church."
4See Fides et Ratio, ^ 53. It should be noted that Vatican documents use para
graph numbers instead of page numbers. For an English translation, I will
simply use the version available on the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.
va /edocs /ENG0216 /_INDEX.HTM.
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The one affirms that faith in authority is the only means of certainty (at
least in regard to knowledge of the divine), and the other affirms that un
aided human reason is the only means of certainty. Kierkegaard has, for
the most part, been vindicated of the charge of outright, or at any rate,
irrational, fideism.5 However, for the Catholic tradition, his repudiation
of natural theology6 generally keeps him too close to the extreme of fideism. Thus, from the Catholic point of view, he can be appropriately reck
oned as one of those thinkers who "helped drive faith and reason further
apart" than they should be, despite the fact that he also seems to be ranked
very highly among such thinkers, since he, along with the likes of Pascal,
helped to "[liberate] reason" from rationalistic presumption, philosophy's
characteristic fault, according to John Paul II.7 Accordingly, the Catholic
Magisterium has, as it were, an official position on Kierkegaard's work:
His work, while having widened the gap between faith and reason, nev
ertheless, contains "precious and seminal insights which, if pursued and
developed with mind and heart rightly tuned, can lead to the discovery
of truth's way."8 In this paper, I want to examine this claim in the context
of Kierkegaard's larger thought, to see just where exactly the disagree
ment between Kierkegaard and Catholicism on the question of "natural
reason" appears to lie, and where the profit in his work may be found on
this question.
The interest of this article is not restricted to Catholic readers who are,
in addition, readers of Kierkegaard. Linda Zagzebski has called Kierkeg
aard a "radical fideist," suggesting that he occupies a rather extreme po
sition on this issue.9 By contrast, the Catholic Church has a long history
of appreciation of natural theology and natural reason's ability to show
God's existence (on which see below). Although, as a Catholic, I disagree
with Kierkegaard about some of these matters, I also believe that the pos
sibilities for dialogue are significant between Kierkegaard and the Catho
lic tradition. Indeed, I think this encounter between two unlikely allies
can serve as a helpful propaedeutic for similar rapprochement between

5C. Stephen Evans's books, Passionate Reason (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1992) and Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco: Baylor University Press,
2006) are two of the best works that seek to rebut the charge that Kierkegaard is
an irrational fideist, as opposed to a "responsible fideist" under which label Evans
argues for including both Kierkegaard and (perhaps surprisingly) Alvin Plantinga
(pp. 203-204 in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self).
6In this paper I will understand by "natural theology" that portion of the en
terprise that attempts to demonstratively prove God's existence without special
revelation. I will sometimes use the phrase "natural reason" or "natural knowl
edge," usually to refer to a non-inferential knowledge not obtained through spe
cial revelation.
7Fides et Ratio, % 76.
8Ibid., % 48.
9Zagzebski goes on to ask "whether there is a sense in which the radical fideist,
Kierkegaard, is nonetheless quite reasonable" (Philosophy o f Religion, p. 71). I think
she is right to wonder this, but she seems to regard it as somewhat against the let
ter, if not the spirit, of Kierkegaard's texts.
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natural theologians and the kinds of Reformed epistemologists that have
been skeptical of natural theology.10*
The most obvious reason for the reservations about Kierkegaard's
work in the Catholic tradition is the anathema pronounced upon those
who would deny natural theology by the First Vatican Council, in a dog
matic constitution promulgated in 1870, just short of fifteen years after
Kierkegaard's death. The canon simply reads, "If anyone shall have said
that the one true God, our Creator and our Lord, cannot be known with
certitude by those things which have been made, by the natural light of
human reason, let him be anathema."11 While Kierkegaard did repudiate
natural theology, many have further assumed that Kierkegaard is an irrationalist and so concerned with passion at the expense of reason that,
they surmise, there is virtually no positive role for reason to play in mak
ing the "leap of faith."12 Evans has done much fine work in showing that
Kierkegaard is unjustly lampooned in this way as an irrationalist and an
irresponsible fideist. This has had the consequence of pulling Kierkegaard
further away from the heresy of fideism, from the Catholic point of view.
It also, however, raises the question, just how far apart are Kierkegaard
and the Catholic tradition?
Another part of the irrationalist myth about Kierkegaard is that he is
so concerned with passionate Christian commitment that he cares noth
ing for Christian revelation along the lines of doctrine and theology. This,
caricature, too, is false. The fact that Kierkegaard often gives way to flam
boyant, and sometimes overdrawn, invective against many of his philo
sophical and theological disputants should not obscure the fact that his
larger picture on these matters is ultimately quite subtle. Thus, although
Kierkegaard's own theological views are hardly in harmony with Catholi
cism on every point, the depth of his own thought allows us resources
for dialogue with the Catholic tradition that go beyond the more polemi
cal of his pieces that often seize the limelight. It is high time to claim the
10See, for example, Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theol
ogy," in Michael Peterson, et al., Philosophy o f Religion: Selected Readings, 3rd edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 261-273.
uFor references to dogmatic sources prior to 1950, I will use the standard DH
numbers, which are keyed to the 41st edition of Heinrich Denzinger's (also ed
ited by Peter Hunermann) Enchiridion Symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum
(Freiburg: Herder, 2007). From time to time I will quote an English translation and
so will use the latest translation of which I am aware, Roy J. Deferrari's render
ing of an earlier edition (the 30th edition), entitled The Sources o f Catholic Dogma
(1957; repr. Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2007). In citing these I will use
DH numbers, followed by references to Deferrari's text (which will be abbrevi
ated SCD, and whose numbers are different because keyed to an earlier version
of Denzinger). Thus, this citation of Vatican I's first canon on Revelation from the
third session of the council is DH, 3026 /SCD, 1806.
12Brand Blanshard's essay, "Kierkegaard on Faith" (in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed.
Jerry H. Gill [Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing, 1969]), espouses this sort of view.
It is important to note in this connection, as M. Jamie Ferreira does, that "Kierkeg
aard never uses any Danish equivalent of 'leap of faith'" ("Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap," in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and
Gordon Marino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 207).
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resources of contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship to stage a more in
formed encounter between Kierkegaard's thought and the Catholic tradi
tion.13 In this paper, I will begin by briefly discussing the attack on natural
theology that often captures the attention of Kierkegaard's readers, and
go on to discuss how the Catholic tradition has approached the matter of
natural theology, taking care to see where and why Kierkegaard's position
ultimately differs.
2. Kierkegaard's Attack on Natural Theology
While this paper is concerned with Kierkegaard's attitude toward reason
generally, it will also focus on the matter of natural theology. The first task
before us, then, is to provide an examination of some of Kierkegaard's sa
lient views (or at any rate, those of his pseudonyms) on natural theology.
The first place to turn is the pseudonymous writings, and especially those
of Johannes Climacus. There, we find the traditional critique of natural
theology in Philosophical Fragments.14
Climacus tells us that
the ultimate potentiation of every passion is always to will its own
downfall, and so it is also with the ultimate passion of the under
standing to will the collision, although in one way or another the
collisions must become its own downfall. Then, then, is the ultimate
paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought it
self cannot think. (PF, p. 37)
That against which the understanding thus collides Climacus labels "the
unknown" (PF, p. 39). Climacus notes that it "hardly occurs to the under
standing to want to demonstrate that this unknown (the god) exists" (PF,
p. 39). He then gives a dilemma for the natural theologian. He writes,
If, namely, the god does not exist, then of course it is impossible to
demonstrate it. But if he does exist, then it is foolishness to want to
demonstrate it, since I, in the very moment the demonstration com
mences, would presuppose it not as doubtful—which a presupposi
tion cannot be, inasmuch as it is a presupposition—but as decided,
13This is a larger inquiry in which I am currently engaged, and of which this
article forms a portion.
14Below I list the works and abbreviations for Kierkegaard's works in this paper:
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (CUP), 2 vols., ed and
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991) vol. 1; Either/ Or, Part II (EO2), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Philosophical Fragments/Jo
hannes Climacus (PF), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princ
eton: Princeton University Press, 1985); The Sickness Unto Death (SUD), ed. and
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980); Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers (JP by volume and entry number), ed.
and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, vol. 1, 1967; vol. 2, 1970; vols. 3 and 4,
1975; and vols. 5-7, 1978).
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because otherwise I would not begin, easily perceiving that the
whole thing would be impossible if he did not exist. (PF, p. 39)

We may, of course, take it for granted that it is impossible to demonstrate
the existence of a non-existent entity. Thus, the only horn that concerns us
from the above dilemma is the horn that tells us that if "the god" (Guden)
does exist, then it is "foolishness" to want to demonstrate it. The reason we
are given here is that if we undertook to demonstrate the existence of God
we would not be taking God's existence to be a doubtful postulate—since
then we would never "begin." Let us call this the "Foolishness Objection"
(FO). What could Climacus mean here?
I think we can be aided somewhat in our attempt to understand the FO
by considering what follows it. Climacus writes,
If, however, I interpret the expression "to demonstrate the existence
of the god" to mean that I want to demonstrate that the unknown,
which exists, is the god, then I do not express myself very felicitously,
for then I demonstrate nothing, least of all an existence, but I develop
the definition of a concept. (PF, pp. 39-40, italics mine)
In this passage, Climacus argues that, if we mean something else by "dem
onstrating" God's existence, namely of moving from "the unknown" to
"the god," then this sort of "demonstration" will prove nothing. In that
case, we are only proving that a given entity, whose existence is no lon
ger being doubted, is in fact the theistic God. This will hardly convince
doubtful parties of God's existence. Let us call this the "Infelicity Objec
tion" (IO).
At this point, it will be helpful to consider William L. Rowe's distinction
between the two parts of theistic argument, of which the first part is the
effort "to prove the existence of a special sort of being."15 The second part
takes the efficacy of the first part for granted, moving from the existence
of God to "the effort . . . to prove that the special sort of being whose
existence has been established in the first part has, and must have, the features—perfect goodness, omnipotence, omniscience, and so on—which go
together to make up the theistic idea of God."16 That is, one would perhaps
not think to bow down and worship, for instance, the unmoved mover
(even if proof for its existence were made manifest), but if the unmoved
mover were sufficiently (and successfully) delineated so as to resemble the
theistic God, theistic devotion could enter into the picture.
Turning our attention back to Climacus, if we distinguish the two parts
of theistic argument, it is not clear why the IO is very serious, especially
if the first part, that of demonstrating the existence of a special sort of
being, were successful. That is, since it is not the job of the second part
to establish the truth of an existential claim, but to expound upon one
15William L. Rowe, Philosophy o f Religion: An Introduction, 4th edition (Belmont:
Thomson, 2007), p. 20. For Rowe, these are actually the two stages of the cosmo
logical argument, but I think the usefulness of his distinction can be extended in
this case.
16Rowe, Philosophy o f Religion, p. 20.
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that has already been established, the IO cannot mount an interesting and
independent charge against theistic argument in general. Thus, the FO is
the real issue in considering Climacus's criticism.
The FO contains Climacus's insistence that if we were to take God's
existence to be doubtful, we would never "begin" with the argument.
This is because natural theology, or at any rate that version of it of
special interest to both Climacus and Catholicism, undertakes to dem
onstrate God's existence from God's works (or alternatively, God's "ef
fects"). The reason that Climacus thinks we would never begin is that
we would be using God's works (i.e., creation) to prove the existence of
a Creator, but the argument would never get off the ground were it not
to premise that the works in question are precisely God's works, which
would not themselves exist without God. The situation, Climacus notes,
is much as if we were going to try to prove the existence of Napoleon by
premising that losing the battle of Waterloo was an (actual) action per
formed by none other than a historical personage named Napoleon (PF,
p. 40). Climacus, however, recognizes that God's case is different than
that of Napoleon's case, since "between the god and his works there is
an absolute relation. . . . God's works, therefore, only the god can do"
(PF, pp. 41-42).
The FO is more interesting than it looks at first, however. Climacus
writes,
The works from which I want to demonstrate his existence do not
immediately and directly exist, not at all. Or are the wisdom in na
ture and the goodness or wisdom in Governance right in front of our
noses? Do we not encounter the most terrible spiritual trials here, and
is it ever possible to be finished with all these trials? (PF, p. 42)17
The idea here seems to be that, in attempting to prove the existence of God
using God's works, we will need to have it assured that they are indeed
God's works, and thus that all of the creation is under the providential care
of the theistic God. This is tantamount to supposing that the problem of
evil is definitively solved before even attempting to marshal the evidence
for God's existence. The lot of this arguer is not to be envied. The argu
ment, however, is not only difficult; it is confused, according to Climacus.
One is, in effect, taking the second, if you will, "thicker" conclusion of the
theistic argument and using it as a premise to prove the first, and "thin
ner" conclusion of the theistic argument.
While I think Climacus has certain forms of the teleological argument in
his sights, (he mentions Socrates as having given a version of the "physicoteleological demonstration for the existence of God" [PF, p. 44]), this is
hardly the only sort of proof under consideration, since Climacus clearly
means to cut short all efforts at demonstrating God's existence. Rather,
Climacus's arguments are directed at the enterprise of natural theology

17Compare CUP, pp. 203-204. We read there, "I observe nature in order to find
God, and I do indeed see omnipotence and wisdom, but I also see much that trou
bles and disturbs. The summa summarum of this is an objective uncertainty. . . ."
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in general, and, at most, the effort to demonstrate God's existence on the
basis of God's works in particular.18
There are, however, relevant differences between, say, the cosmological
and teleological arguments. While I am not interested here in rendering
a verdict on whether Climacus is correct with regard to all forms of the
teleological argument, it is worth noticing that this style of argument may
appear more likely to play into his hand than the cosmological argument.
The reason for this is that the teleological argument begins immediately
with considerations about God's having designed objects in the natural
world for an end. Thus, Aquinas's fifth way "is taken from the governance
of the world."19
Climacus is likely to argue that it is precisely the governance that is
supposed to be noticed in the creation. But how does one recognize that
things behave "designedly" unless one already supposes what the divine
purpose might wish to accomplish? That is, perhaps we surmise that some
events in the world transpire much as if they were purposed by a benevo
lent creator. This benevolence is then precisely what is in question when
we arrive at the vexed problem of evil, which is especially troublesome
when the traditional theistic understanding imputes benevolence on a
maximal scale to the Creator. Climacus's worry here might be expressed
by saying that he develops the suggestion that theistic arguments them
selves conflate the two parts of theistic arguments, and that actually the
first part cannot get off the ground without presupposing the soundness
of the second part, which is simply to beg the question. With regard to the
teleological argument, the suggestion deserves the sort of scrutiny I can
not give it here. But with regard to the cosmological argument, Climacus's
suggestion may not be as plausible.
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas uses a cosmological style of ar
gument to prove the existence of an unmoved mover. Using this proce
dure, Aquinas then argues that the required sort of unmoved mover must
also be, among other things, eternal, purely active, immaterial, simple,
18The Catholic tradition tends to emphasize this brand of natural theology,
i.e., a posteriori proofs for the existence of God, as opposed to a priori arguments.
Although the latter form is especially exemplified in St. Anselm's famous onto
logical argument, this form is not as typical as the a posteriori proofs. No doubt
part of the reason for this is St. Thomas Aquinas's long tenure as the semi-official
theologian of the Church, coupled with the fact that he famously argued against
Anselm's ontological argument. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 5
vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1948, repr. Allen, TX:
Christian Classics, 1981), vol. 1. I will cite texts from this work using the Part,
Question, and Article. Thus, this reference is from ST, Ia.2.1, esp. Reply to Objec
tion 2. Climacus gives a criticism of Spinoza's ontological argument in the note on
PF, pp. 41-42, but I will not deal specifically with this argument, since the focus
in this paper is on natural theology, specifically as it is commonly conceived of
in the Catholic tradition. Interested readers may wish to consult Robert C. Rob
erts, Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments
(Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1986), pp. 74-78, whose account of
Climacus's discussion of the ontological argument seems to me to be on the mark
in the main.
19ST, Ia.2.3.
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and, finally, good.20 Climacus appears to allege that theistic arguments
presuppose the goodness of the Creator so as to move from God's works
(the relevant conception of which, he thinks, already presupposes a theistic view of creation) to the conclusion that God exists. In the case of the
cosmological argument, however, this objection may be more difficult to
sustain. Without making the vaunted claim (a serious defense of which
would require a wholly separate inquiry) that the cosmological argument
itself is somehow on more secure footing than the teleological argument,
we can notice that Aquinas's treatment of the latter purports to reason
from the governance (one of Kierkegaard's favorite ways of referring to
God) of the world to the conclusion that there is a God. Climacus's com
plaint is that one cannot speak of governance without a governor, and
here we will need an intentional agent. With regard to the cosmologi
cal argument, it is not immediately so clear, however, whether we will
need an intentional agent when it is the phenomenon of motion that we
are trying to explain. To establish the existence of a prime mover (or un
caused cause, or self-existent being, etc.) is, of course, the first part of the
cosmological argument. The fact that the second part will then argue that
the entity whose existence has been established must also be the theistic God need not affect the argument for the primary existential claim,
namely, that an independent or self-existent being exists. The resources
for mounting this first argument are as likely to be found in pagan antiq
uity as in a religiously-loaded theistic metaphysic.21 For this reason, Climacus's critique of natural theology, as found in Philosophical Fragments,
is, at best, incomplete.
When our topic is widened, however, to a concern over natural (though
non-inferential) knowledge of God, independent of special revelation,
Climacus receives the idea much more positively. Climacus insists that
"Socrates did not have faith that the god existed" (PF, p. 87). Here it is
important to contrast the belief in the eternal God's existence and the fact
that the eternal God deigned to enter into time in the incarnation. On this
point, Kierkegaard writes, explicitly of Fragments, "I do not believe that
God exists [er til, eternally is], but know it; whereas I believe that God has
existed [har vsret til] (the historical)" (JP, 3:3085). Socratic faith is an "ana
logue" to Christian faith because Socrates believes in the face of objective
uncertainty, whereas Christian faith believes in the face of the "absur
dity" of the incarnation (CUP, p. 205). How then is there risk, or objective
uncertainty, for Socrates, if God's existence is supposed to be the object
of knowledge?

20See chaps. 13, 15, 16, 18, and 37 of Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God, trans.
Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975).
21Note that one can accept a cosmological argument and not a teleological argu
ment, at least in theory. In this regard, one might consider that the metaphysics
behind Aquinas's cosmological arguments is largely Aristotelian, and that, while
Aristotle believed in the irreducibility of form (which includes the idea that an
organism will develop in a very particular way, much as if it were designed) in the
universe, he did not believe in a "Divine Craftsman," and so would not likely have
put forward a teleological argument. On this point, see Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The
Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 18-19.
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The idea here seems to be that the risk has to do with the source of
the knowledge, for Climacus. There is objective uncertainty precisely be
cause scouring nature for evidence for God, in the abstract, generates a
conflict between the evidence for wise governance and the evil present in
the world (CUP, pp. 203-204). This is the evidence available to a distanced
and objective observer. But the individual who rubs the wonderful lamp
of freedom with "ethical passion" finds that God comes into existence for
her (CUP, p. 138).22 That is, the true and natural knowledge of God's exis
tence is obscured by one's failure to relate to one's own life with passion.
Without this impediment, or rather by actively relating to one's own life
with passion, there is a natural (though again, non-inferential) knowledge
of God, according to Climacus. He writes,
[God] is in the creation, everywhere in the creation, but he is not
there directly, and only when the single individual turns inward into
himself (consequently only in the inwardness of self-activity) does
he become aware and capable of seeing God. (CUP, p. 243)
That is, because God is not an object, but a subject, the individual has only
a subjective way to knowledge of God, as opposed to an objective way.23
Sin can thus provide an impediment to knowledge of God, but ethical pas
sion can reopen the way to knowledge of God, independently of special
revelation.
From the first critique in Fragments, we can see that Climacus appears
to regard the effort to prove God's existence using demonstrative and ob
jective reason as, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, pernicious. In particular,
it can often distract one from the real existential claim that faith makes
upon a Christian. The more one hangs one's hat on a proof, the more one's
faith is simply a matter of intellect, which, as it turns out, Kierkegaard
does not think is very secure as far as its ability to prove God's existence is
concerned. On the other hand, there is knowledge of God available to hu
man beings that we might fittingly call "natural" in that it can be acquired
without special revelation.
In one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard writes,

22In previous publications, I interpreted this passage differently and in a way
that was at odds with the interpretation offered by C. Stephen Evans in his "Realism
and Antirealism in Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript," The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 157. I now believe that my earlier interpre
tation on this point was mistaken, despite the fact that I am not sure I can fully
endorse Evans's suggestion to interpret this along the lines of a moral standard.
I do think he is right, however, when he notes that, "One might say, for example,
that Kierkegaard means only that God comes into existence for a person in the
sense that the person first becomes aware of God's reality when she acts freely and
responsibly." I thank Nick Engel for help in correcting me on this point.
23See CUP, pp. 162-163 and 199-200. Also, on the topic of natural knowledge
of God in Kierkegaard, see Robert C. Roberts's very helpful article, "The Socratic
Knowledge of God," in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Concept of Anxiety,
ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985).
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To stand on one's foot and prove the existence of God is altogether
different from falling on one's knees and thanking him. The former is
a delicate silk ladder which one throws up like a romantic knight of
cognition and somehow uses in a curious manner to get aloft, simul
taneously securing the ladder while standing upon it (unlike fire
men who enter each floor to secure the shinning rope)—the latter is
a solid stairway, and even if one advances more slowly, he is on the
way and all the more securely. (JP, 2:2280)
The idea here seems to be that the natural theologian is assigning him
self a really impossible task, namely, to (rationally) secure the very edifice
upon which he is constructing his faith. Faith has primarily to do with the
will,24 for Kierkegaard, and thus to construct one's faith on the basis of an
intellectual argument is ultimately inappropriate. Faith and demonstra
tive reasoning are the operations of, if you will, different organs of the
person. The former is the one thing needful, and the latter does not help
us acquire it, for Kierkegaard.
While I think that Climacus's arguments against the attempt by natural
theology to demonstrate God's existence ultimately miss their mark, this
does not mean that Kierkegaard and Climacus have nothing important
to offer us in a related connection.25 Rather, Climacus's attack on natural
theology is a narrow (if erroneous) instance of a wider (and ultimately cor
rect, in my view) suspicion of reason's capabilities in relation to faith. Hav
ing things reasoned out in a distanced and objective way can only assure
one of so much, and cannot cancel the "pain and crisis of decision" (CUP,
p. 129), as Climacus puts it. As Merold Westphal comments, "Far from
providing support to faith, objectivism leads the individual to the place
where faith is not even possible."26 This is an area where Kierkegaard and
the Catholic tradition will likely disagree, since, as we shall see below, the
Catholic tradition thinks that reason actually make faith possible.
This way of approaching the matter, however, is not the whole truth.
It is surely important for Catholics to approach Kierkegaard "with mind
and heart rightly tuned," but it is also important for Catholic thinkers and
natural theologians to beware of distorting reason and removing it from
its theological moorings. On this point, Pope Benedict XVI writes that we
have "cut ourselves off" from a kind of "primordial knowledge" and that
"an increasing scientific know-how is preventing us from being aware
24Kierkegaard writes, "Faith's conflict with the world is not a battle of thought
with doubt, thought with thought. This was the confusion which finally ended in
the madness of the system. Faith, the man of faith's conflict with the world, is a
battle of character. Human vanity resides in wanting to comprehend, the vanity of
not willing to obey as a child but of wanting to be an adult who can comprehend
and who then will not obey what he cannot comprehend, that is, who will not
obey" (JP, 2:1129).
25This, or something like it, was the worry of an anonymous reviewer who won
dered why we should care about Climacus's critique of natural theology if it is
simply mistaken.
26See Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading o f Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1996), p. 52.
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of the fact of creation."27 Faith is at least partly a human act of will, for
the Catholic tradition,28 and this act of will can still be denied and even
obscured in various ways, many of which have to do, as we shall have
occasion to note later, with the presence of evil in the world. This is the
reason for Climacus's "most terrible spiritual trials." This may suggest
that the Climacan and Catholic notions of "objectivity" are relevantly dif
ferent. For Climacus, the notion may be exaggerated by the conceits of the
Hegelian system, and reliance on it may very well inhibit the possibility of
faith.29 We can now turn to the Catholic tradition to consider a version of
its view of the promises of natural theology.
3. Natural Theology and Epistemology in the Catholic Tradition
The Dogmatic Constitution On the Catholic Faith, from which the canon
anathematizing natural theology's naysayers is taken, makes it clear that
the Church regards her original source for this doctrine on natural theol
ogy to be none other than St. Paul in Romans 1:20.30 That passage reads,
"Ever since the creation of the world, [God's] invisible attributes of eter
nal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived
in what he has made. As a result they have no excuse." Thus, the point
of natural theology seems to be that it provides a kind of "public" con
firmation of the fact that humans should worship a sovereign God. In
the aforementioned Dogmatic Constitution we read that this fact "can be
known with certitude by the natural light of human reason from created
things."31 Commenting on this passage, the Catechism o f the Catholic Church
27"In the Beginning . . . " A Catholic Understanding o f Creation and the Fall, trans.
Boniface Ramsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), p. 28.
28The Catechism o f the Catholic Church (2nd edition, Washington, D.C.: United
States Catholic Conference 1994), ^ 155, which cites Aquinas's definition at ST,
H-n.2.9 and DH, 3010 /SCD, 1791.
29It is possible that Kierkegaard himself reacted to the overconfidence of the
Hegelian system by an underconfident skepticism. See A. J. Rudd, "Kierkegaard and
the Sceptics," British Journal fo r the History o f Philosophy 6 (1998), pp. 71-88, esp. p. 87
where Rudd notes that a kind of natural knowledge of God through an "unsatisfied
hunger" could have arisen from personal neurosis. In my view, the Catholic tradi
tion should begin from the supposition that no such neuroses are present in ordinary
cases, and let that be the standard for "objectivity" now conceived more positively.
30Citations from Christian Scripture will be taken from the New American Bible.
31DH, 3004 /SCD, 1785. One might wonder (as an anonymous reviewer did)
whether this canon requires demonstrative "proofs" or simply the knowledge
garnered in one way or another from created things. I will not arrogate to my
self the role of distinguishing where the heresy is to be found. However, the tra
ditional position has been to reject innate knowledge of God (which should be
distinguished from Reformed Epistemology's understanding of proper basicality
and Karl Rahner's transcendental knowledge of God, on which see below) and to
affirm that God's existence can be demonstrated, especially through the understand
ing that created things are the effect for which God is the cause. On this point, see
Pope Pius X's famous anti-modernist oath (DH, 3538 /SCD, 2145) and Ludwig Ott,
Fundamentals o f Catholic Dogma, ed. James Canon Batible, trans. Patrick Lynch, 4th
edition (1955; repr. Rockford: Tan Books, 1960), pp. 13-17.
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writes, "without this capacity, man would not be able to welcome God's
revelation. Man has this capacity because he is created 'in the image of
God.'"32 Thus, another of the primary reasons that the Church defends
natural theology is that it actually makes it possible for human beings to
receive God's revelation.
The Catholic Church thus claims that certainty can be achieved using
natural reason about such matters as whether or not there is a God. Yet,
the type of certainty that is being pleaded for is sometimes a bit unclear.
The Catechism notes,
Created in God's image and called to know and love him, the per
son who seeks God discovers certain ways of coming to know him.
These are also called proofs for the existence of God, not in the sense
of proofs in the natural sciences, but rather in the sense of "converg
ing and convincing arguments," which allow us to attain certainty
about the truth.33
A proof in the natural sciences, at least as they are often construed, would
seem to be out of the question, since the natural sciences have as their sub
ject precisely the physical world, and theology has as its subject the things
of God that transcend the physical. The Catechism goes on to say that, "The
world, and man, attest that they contain within themselves neither their
first principle nor their final end, but rather that they participate in Be
ing itself, which alone is without origin or end."34 While the attestation in
question here appears to come from the world and from our knowledge
of ourselves, the manner of this attestation is not addressed. This is sig
nificant, because we are told that things in the world attest that they do
not contain their first principle, but this fact is precisely a premise for any
cosmological argument.
For instance, consider Rowe's famous formulation of the cosmological
argument:
1.

Every being (that exists or ever did exist) is either a dependent be
ing or a self-existent being.

2.

Not every being is a dependent being.

Therefore,
3.

There exists a self-existent being.35

32Catechism, % 36.
33Ibid., % 31.
34Ibid., % 34.
35I have adapted this formulation from Rowe's The Cosmological Argument (Princ
eton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 258. Rowe's formulation in Philosophy o f
Religion, p. 21 has "not every being can be a dependent being." The latter formulation
still requires PSR for the argument's soundness (which of course Rowe disputes), and
thus could be held to be a posteriori, depending upon what sort of access one allows to
the truth of PSR. However, this formulation gives the proposition modal force, and
could be rendered ~0(x)(Dx), whereas the formulation I have chosen in the main text
would be ~(x)(Dx), which is logically equivalent to (3x)~(Dx). (3x)~(Dx) clearly has
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Rowe goes on to argue that the celebrated Principle of Sufficient Reason
(PSR) is "the fundamental principle," on which the premises of the Cos
mological Argument rest, but that, in his view, we are simply unable to
know the truth or falsity of PSR. PSR, as Rowe lays it out, requires that,
" there must be an explanation (a) of the existence o f any being and (b) of any
positive fact whatever."36 Rowe and the Catholic Church may part ways on
the question of our knowledge of PSR, but Pope Pius XII, in his encyclical
Humani Generis, appeared to insist, along with Rowe, on its importance, in
particular, for natural theology, as one of the "constant metaphysical prin
ciples" that the Church accepts and protects.3637 Thus, while the relevance of
such metaphysical principles is not primarily what is under dispute, the
fact of our knowledge of such metaphysical principles does appear to be
a matter of dispute.
Curiously, however, the Church never appears to "legislate epistemol
ogy," at least with regard to such metaphysical principles. We are thus left
asking how we might come to know them. This is indeed a question that
Rowe asks, but there might be some reason, in our current epistemological
climate, to wonder whether he has adequately surveyed the epistemologi
cal options available to the theist. After considering the idea that we might
be able to know PSR intuitively, and dismissing the suggestion for the
reason that able philosophers fail to apprehend its truth, he writes,
Here, perhaps, all that one can do is carefully reflect on what PSR
says and form one's own judgment on whether it is a fundamental
truth about the way reality must be. And if after carefully reflecting
on PSR it does strike one in that way, that person may well be ratio
nally justified in taking it to be true and, having seen how it supports
the premises of the Cosmological Argument, accepting the conclu
sion of that argument as true.38
One might be quick to remind us that if Catholicism is in the picture, then
we need to be discussing certainty, and not simply rational justification.
Certainty is what Vatican I claimed for reason's ability to know God.39 But
it is worth inquiring into just what we mean by the term, "reason."
existential import, whereas in the case of ~©(x)(Dx), the proposition's modal character
reduces its existential import to conceptual analysis (we eventually get □(3x)~(Dx),
which requires an investigation into all possible states of affairs, rather than simply
the actual ones). An existential claim like (3x)~(Dx) is generally supposed to be dis
covered by empirical analysis of the nature of dependent beings. Thus, I have chosen
the argument in the main text because it seems to me to be more clearly a posteriori.
36Rowe, Philosophy o f Religion, p. 23, italics original.
37DH, 3892 /SCD, 2320, italics mine.
38Rowe, Philosophy o f Religion, pp. 31-32.
39To deal in any depth with such an issue (which concerned Newman so much
in the Grammar) is simply outside the scope of this paper. For my part, I find it pre
liminarily helpful to consider the fact that Plantinga rejects the need for Cartesian
certainty (as it seems does Aquinas), but also notes the need for what he describes
as psychological certainty in order for a belief to be known (see Plantinga, Warrant
and Proper Function [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993], pp. 76-77).
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Aquinas, for instance, has it that natural reason "begins from sense,"
and thus, "can go as far as it can be led by sensible things."40 That is, natu
ral reason operates on the data given to us by the senses in such a way as
to draw conclusions from such data, given the sensible things, and the
abstract principles that allow deduction from them. Aquinas does not,
for instance, grant a serious hearing to a kind of Cartesian global skep
ticism, of the sort that would have me wondering whether 2 + 3 = 5 on
the basis of the far-fetched possibility that an evil genius might be ma
nipulating my brain. On this point, Thomas Hibbs writes, "Aquinas would
urge . . . that reasonable doubts are always local, never global; they are
formulated against a set of background assumptions that could never
all at once be successfully put in question. If doubt were to become truly
global, it would be fatal."41 Thus, natural reason does not begin, nor need
it begin, where Descartes does in his Meditations, in the search for indubi
table truths in the face of global skepticism. Rather, Aquinas tells us that
natural reason "contains two things: images derived from the sensible ob
jects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them
intelligible conceptions."42 What this means is that Aquinas's conception
of knowledge already assumes that certain capabilities (among them the
hotly contested power of abstraction) are in place, and, to a certain extent,
functioning properly.
To employ this sort of account, one might include a number of princi
ples that are necessary before conducting the kinds of demonstrations that
Aquinas saw as paradigms of scientia, or demonstrative knowledge, as
propositions apprehended by the natural light in a non-inferential way.43
John I. Jenkins writes, "Presented with certain phantasmata, one spontane
ously forms an idea in the intellect's first operation, and in the second
operation the intellect is moved to make a non-inferential judgment. Such
judgments are justified as basic."44 To say that these judgments are basic
is to say that they have the right sort of positive epistemic status; the right
sort of warrant that, if the belief is also true, could certify it as known,
even if the belief has such warrant without being inferred from other be
liefs, and even if the subject is not aware that each of the conditions for its

40ST, Ia.12.12.
41See Hibbs's editor's introduction to the selection of Aquinas's writings enti
tled, On Human Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), p. xi. Also, see John I. Jenkins,
Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), p. 49, where we read, "The concern here is not with skeptical worries and
the focus is not on autonomous, individualistic investigation; it is rather with the
sort of intellectual formation required so that what is most intelligible in itself
becomes most intelligible to us."
42ST, Ia.12.13.
43One of Jenkins's chief claims is that "among Aquinas's epistemic terms there is
no wholly unproblematic correlate for knowledge" (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas
Aquinas, p. 121). Thus, however we might like to put contemporary epistemologi
cal puzzles, a thorough (and linguistically sophisticated) exegesis of Aquinas will
be necessary in order to understand his epistemological contribution.
44Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, p. 121.
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having this kind of warrant are met.45 A basic belief is therefore a belief
that is warranted (though sometimes "justified" is used) in an immediate
way, as opposed to being warranted on the basis of some other belief's
authority.46 Jenkins makes it explicit that principles of the sciences, in the
mould of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, are the objects of this basic knowl
edge. It seems to me, however, that Jenkins's account suggests that Pius
X II' s "constant metaphysical principles," among them that of sufficient
reason, might well also be included in the kinds of judgments that, on
Jenkins's account, the Angelic Doctor might deem basic.47 We thus might
be able to construct an authentically Catholic hybrid of natural theol
ogy and basic beliefs by combining basic beliefs in Pius X II' s "constant
45Jenkins is clearly in dialogue with Plantinga here, a point he makes explicitly.
For Plantinga's account, one should refer to his justly famous "Warrant" trilogy,
of which the final installment is Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 2000). Jenkins himself writes, "There may be conditions (apart from the
condition that the belief in question is true) for a subject knowing something to
which, when he knows, the subject has no special epistemic access as to whether
or not they are met; and he may be completely unaware of whether or not they
are met" (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 120-121). By allowing for a
certain kind of externalism here, I do not mean to contradict John Paul Il's claim
that, "Within visible creation, man is the only creature who not only is capable of
knowing but who knows that he knows, and is therefore interested in the real truth
of what he perceives" (Fides et Ratio, ^ 25, italics mine). This might seem to include
an internalist requirement for awareness of having met the conditions for knowl
edge. I think, however, that what the Pope is actually insisting upon is that human
knowledge is inherently self-reflexive (much in the way that inner sense perceives
that the animal perceives, for St. Augustine in On Free Choice o f the Will 2.4 (trans.
Thomas Williams [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 37]). Thus, we are aware that
our knowing faculty has been deployed, can ascertain, using the senses and other
faculties, whether any impediments exist in the way of its proper deployment,
and are aware that our human existence is the right sort of context in which this
knowing can take place.
46On this point, see Aristotle's famous discussion in Posterior Analytics A.3.
See Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, 2nd edition, trans. (with commentary) Jonathan
Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
47The truth of a principle as basic as PSR is constantly presupposed, not ar
gued for, in both Aristotle's procedure and Jenkins's interpretation of Aquinas.
In support of the latter claim, notice that Jenkins writes, "A person can come
to construct a demonstrative syllogism in the following way. Through ordinary
observation one can come to know that vines shed their leaves annually, and one
may seek the cause of this fact. One easily observes that not only vines, but also
trees and other plants, shed their leaves. One can then discover that all deciduous
plants belong to the genus of broad-leaved plants. One discovers, then, that being
broad-leaved, having this generic form, is the cause of the deciduousness of vines.
Moreover, since this is the genus of vine, being broad-leaved is in the definition of
vine. Consequently one has arrived at that part of the essence of vine which is
the cause of its deciduousness" (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, 14). Here
it is everywhere assumed that one can indeed seek out the explanation or cause
of the positive fact that vines shed their leaves annually, because it is likewise
assumed that there is such an explanation. Aristotle certainly believes that the
explanation of a given fact is a proper object of inquiry, on which see Posterior
Analytics B.1, 89b23-25.
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metaphysical principles" with natural theology's arguments that presup
pose the availability of such principles.48
Accounts of basic beliefs are often objected to because they simply absorb
claims with prominent objectors into a privileged and sacrosanct set, thereby
relieving the believer of any obligation to provide reasons for her belief in
these claims. In answer to this charge, the defender of this brand of Catholic
epistemology can reply that what is claimed to be basic is not a privileged
proposition available only to partisans of Catholic Christian truth, but rather
a set of metaphysical principles that are constantly assumed by many, from
respected philosophic voices in pagan antiquity to crime scene investiga
tors, who never seriously entertain the hypothesis that the existence of the
suspected murder weapon in the relevant place is a "brute fact."49
Thus, to return to our point of departure, the view we are examining
here would hold that God's existence can indeed by known with certainty,
and by no other capacity than natural reason, but that it is precisely natural
reason that would infer God's existence on the basis of foundational prin
ciples that are not themselves inferred. In this context, it means something
to call reason "natural." It means that it is ordinary and natural for hu
mans to correctly believe that certain principles are in fact true, which they
constantly take for granted in their everyday lives and only venture to call
into question when the conversation shifts to abstruse philosophical dis
cussion. Thus, one might undertake Rowe's suggested introspection, and
find that PSR just does seem compelling. We must, however, leave open
the possibility that one could know (and not just be rationally justified in
believing) PSR just because one is, in effect, designed to know PSR. Perhaps
one is also aware that from PSR one can infer the existence of a self-existent
being, and perhaps also knows of arguments that might convince her that
this self-existent being is the theistic God. If so, these beliefs might then
qualify as certain knowledge if the foundational beliefs are known, and
the inferential relations are clear. All of this appears to be consistent with
what the Church wants to claim, namely, that non-sectarian (but nonethe
less natural and human) reason can make a powerful contribution to belief
in God, but that reason might first need to exorcise itself of any skeptical
worries about, among other things, evil demons and brains in vats.
4. Natural Reason in Kierkegaard and Catholic Theology
In this section, I want to briefly consider two important contributions
from Catholic theologians along the lines of non-inferential belief in God.
To claim that belief in God is basic is a tenet typically associated with
Reformed Epistemology, and has often been taken to distinguish the
latter from Catholic views.50 Recently, however, Stephen R. Grimm has
48Joe LaPorte is currently working on similar ideas, though with no connection
to Kierkegaard. I have benefited a great deal from his helpful suggestions and
criticisms.
49I owe the crime scene example to William Rowe, who often uses such an ex
ample in the context of discussing PSR.
50For example, consider John Zeis, "Natural Theology: Reformed?" in Rational
Faith, ed. Linda Zagzebski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), p. 50.
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argued that Cardinal Newman's epistemological views are substantially
in harmony with those of Reformed Epistemology.51 Newman, for in
stance, takes the case of a child (he supposes the age of five or six), who
forms his belief in God, so it seems, without inferring it from other beliefs.
He writes,
The child keenly understands that there is a difference between right
and wrong; and when he has done what he believes to be wrong, he
is conscious that he is offending One to whom he is amenable, whom
he does not see, who sees him. His mind reaches forward with a
strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor, sovereign
over him, mindful, and just. It comes to him like an impulse of na
ture to entertain it.52
Here, it seems, the child finds himself with a belief in God as a Moral Gov
ernor, a belief that is not inferred from others, but comes to him simply by
a connatural sense of conscience. There is a strikingly similar claim, though
not as explicit, in Kierkegaard's ethical exemplar, Judge William, who is
relating his experiences at the age of five (EO2, p. 266). William, we learn,
was strictly brought up by his father, so as to inculcate this omnipresent
sense of duty, and the father became, to William, as he discusses his Latin
lessons, "the incarnation of the rule" (EO2, p. 269). Reflecting further on
this aspect of his upbringing, Judge William writes, "Thus I received a
very profound impression that there was something called duty and that
this had eternal validity" (EO2, p. 269). Judge William even writes of this
connection to the eternal in duty that, "this is the true demonstration of
the immortality of the soul" (EO2, p. 270). Now, it is certainly true that
Newman's views on conscience are thought to be a clue to our awareness
of God's existence, whereas Judge William draws this out more explic
itly to the immortality of the soul. However, the similarities on this point
suggest that Kierkegaard can countenance an awareness of God and the
eternal even in the natural human being.53
Zeis argues that belief in God's existence is not properly basic. I have found much
to agree with in Zeis's chapter, but I want to argue that Catholicism can accommo
date the claim that belief in God is properly basic (or, at any rate, that there can be a
non-discursive, and non-perceptual, awareness of the existence of God), especially
for those individuals who may have never considered (or indeed may not have the
aptitude for adequately considering) PSR and/or the cosmological argument.
51Stephen R. Grimm, "Cardinal Newman, Reformed Epistemologist?," American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2001), pp. 497-522. Grimm notes a difference be
tween Plantinga and Newman in that the former includes specifically Christian be
liefs among those that could be properly basic, whereas the latter does not (p. 515).
It should also not escape our notice in this paper that M. Jamie Ferreira has fruitfully
compared Newman and Kierkegaard in her article, "Leaps and Circles: Kierkegaard
and Newman on Faith and Reason," Religious Studies 30 (1994), pp. 379-397.
52Chap. 5, section 1, Essay in Aid o f a Grammar o f Assent, p. 103, italics mine.
53In regard to some of Kierkegaard's own views related to matters such as con
science, see C. Stephen Evans's excellent essay, "Can God Be Hidden and Evident
at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian Reflections," Faith and Philosophy 23
(2006), pp. 241-253.
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In a similar way, Kierkegaard, in his own journals, writes, in 1848, "I
cannot get away from the thought I have had from the beginning: does not
every man in his quiet mind think about God" (JP, 6:6158). It is also signifi
cant that in a draft for Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard has Climacus
say, "just as no one has ever proved it [i.e., God's existence], so there has
never been an atheist, even though there certainly have been many who
have been unwilling to let what they knew (that the God [Guden] exists)
get control of their minds" (JP, 3:3606). Thus, although Kierkegaard does
not appear to endorse the soundness of a proof for God's existence in the
ordinary sense, he cannot quite pull himself (or even the pseudonym most
opposed to arguments for God's existence) away from the idea that hu
mans might have some kind of fundamental knowledge of God, whether
they recognize it or not.
This line of thought has many distinguished proponents, among them
the Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. Rahner made an especially memora
ble mark on theology in his doctrine of the "anonymous Christian," which
is often cited in discussions of religious inclusivism.54 However, he also
believed in what he called an "unthematic and anonymous" knowledge
of God.55 This "transcendental" knowledge was said by Rahner to be co
present with every act of knowledge, because it was different from and
necessary for an individual apprehension of any single object of knowledge.56 Rahner even claims that this transcendental knowledge "has to be
called a posteriori insofar as every transcendental experience is mediated
by a categorical encounter with concrete reality in our world, both the
world of things and the world of persons."57
While never directly repudiating the traditional "proofs" for God's
existence, Rahner insists, "neither should this a posteriority be misunder
stood in the sense that God could simply be indoctrinated from without
as an object of our knowledge."58 Thus, while Rahner does not wish to
impugn the a posteriori character of the natural knowledge of God, he ap
pears to want to insist, as seems fitting given the foregoing, that natu
ral knowledge is never identical with what we might call purely secular
knowledge (the latter of which is ultimately a chimera). That is, even our
"natural" experience is already saturated with the presence of God, and
while Rahner himself constantly points out that we can deny, or "sup
press" this,59 we nevertheless always have this primordial awareness as a
part of our very being, especially as prior to, and necessary for, any act of
understanding.
Despite his clear disavowal of natural theology (in contrast to Rahner's
measured and somewhat tepid reception), Kierkegaard would likely
54See, for instance, John Hick, "Religious Pluralism and Salvation," Faith and
Philosophy 5 (1988), pp. 365-377, esp. p. 376.
55Karl Rahner, Foundations o f Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (New York:
Crossroad, 2006), p. 21.
56Foundations o f Christian Faith, pp. 20-21.
57Ibid., p. 52.
58Ibid., p. 53.
59See, for example, Foundations o f Christian Faith, pp. 28-29.
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approve of much of what Rahner has said in connection with a transcen
dental knowledge of God. As early as 1838, he wrote,
The development of a priori basic concepts is like a prayer in the
Christian sphere, for one would think that here a person is related to
God in the freest, most subjective way, and yet we are told that it is
the Holy Spirit that effects prayer, so that the only prayer remaining
would be to be able to pray, although upon closer inspection even
this has been effected in us—so also there is no deductive develop
ment of concepts or what one would call that which has some con
stitutive power—man can only concentrate upon it, and to will this,
if this will is not an empty, unproductive gift, corresponds to this
single prayer and like this is effected, so to speak, in us. (JP, 2:2257)
In the margin for this entry, Kierkegaard also notes, "One can therefore
also say that all knowing is like breathing, a re-spiratio" (JP, 2:2258). The
point of these entries, though not easy to discern, seems to be that, in the
Christian sphere, one would think that one could simply pray to God,
much in the same way that one would lay his entreaties before a king.
However, it is not like this, since the Spirit effects prayer, and indeed
makes us capable of it. In a similar way, our concepts and our understand
ing are not the job of our autonomous deductive reason, but rather, all our
knowing is connected with the Holy Spirit, which makes each knowing
act possible. This, together with some of the material we saw earlier where
Kierkegaard and Climacus recognize that all are aware, in some sense, of
God, allows us to glimpse resources for a Kierkegaardian appropriation of
something like Rahner's transcendental knowledge of God.
What we have discovered in the foregoing is that, while the Catholic
Church endorses natural reason's ability to know God's existence prior to
revelation in the strict sense, one profitable and interesting way to do this
is to affirm that reason can provide arguments and infer the conclusions
from the premises, but nonetheless obtain knowledge of the principles
that undergird the premises through the guidance of the very kind of
properly functioning cognitive equipment that was, if you will, installed
by our Creator. This is not to say anything more (or less) than that, while
atheists can come to knowledge of a great many things, ultimately the
atheist's project is unworkable, from the Catholic point of view. This is
because even our ability to grasp truths that are not strictly religious or
supernatural is already overrun with God's active presence.
Perhaps this means that Climacus is partly right in his attack on natural
theology in that we do already know, in some sense, the existence of God
prior to proving it. However, the sense in which we know God's existence
prior to its proof is the sense in which we are all aware of God's existence in
our innermost being, and yet there are significant impediments, having to
do with the reign of sin in our lives, which can hamper our ability to make
this knowledge explicit. Natural reason can make us aware of God's exis
tence using faculties generally available to all rational beings. As a result,
according to Paul, we have "no excuse." Our sinful tendency to attempt to
live without God is checked by our ability to discern clear signs of God's
existence, whether that be through Newman's route of conscience (where
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a significant parallel exists in Kierkegaard's writings), or through more tra
ditional demonstrative evidence. No doubt this is why the Catechism tells
us that this natural knowledge enables us to receive God's revelation.60
My view here comes to this: natural theology is helpful and available,
but this does not mean that we have demonstrative knowledge of the prin
ciples that undergird the premises of the traditional arguments for God's
existence. Some of these principles, such as PSR, can be had by way of
a more basic, non-inferential knowledge that has everything to do with
the proper functioning of our cognitive faculties in the right sort of en
vironment. As it happens, strong similarities between Kierkegaard and
Plantinga along the lines of properly basic belief in God have already been
shown.61 If Kierkegaard is a proper functionalist of sorts, we might ask
ourselves whether Kierkegaard would find some basic metaphysical prin
ciples, such as PSR, to be properly basic. If so, what would prevent him
from endorsing the cosmological argument? In addition, there are even
parallels (or at any rate, analogues)62 in the Catholic tradition along the
lines of a properly basic belief in God to be glimpsed in Newman and
in Rahner. Properly basic knowledge of metaphysical principles (such as
PSR) and properly basic knowledge of God are certainly distinct, but they
are related. Rahnefi s transcendental knowledge is not thematic (which
has the drawback of being somewhat mysterious, but the advantage of
not characterizing God as a simple object when nothing whatever exists
without God's constant sustenance), but is still behind any knowledge of
principles such as PSR. Newman's route of conscience is a different way,
but it still relies on the active presence of God to the person to purchase the
reliability of her moral awareness. While the Catholic tradition is some
what more reticent to believe that the claims of faith per se are properly
basic,63 and I share this reticence, there is still much that Kierkegaard and
60Catechism, ^ 36.
61See Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self, esp. chaps. 10 and 11. My view
seems to be somewhere in between his "ambitious" and "modest" epistemologies,
since I don't think we need a reply to skepticism (which disqualifies my view from
being "ambitious"), but I think there are also elements of "modest" epistemology
that may be too modest for the Catholic tradition (see Evans's aforementioned
work, pp. 185-188).
62These parallels or analogues may or may not be examples of properly basic
belief in Plantinga's sense. To what degree they are does not concern me. What
concerns me is that they are claimed to be examples of belief in God (available to
all and sundry, without, for example, the uniquely special grace of infused con
templation) that are not based on the kind of demonstrative reasoning that would
be possible only for the intellectual elite. This is parallel (though it need not be
identical) to Plantinga's claim that his version of basic knowledge of God is not
arrived at by way of demonstrative reasoning and inferences, but "in a much more
immediate way" (Warranted Christian Belief, p. 175).
63See, for instance, Thomas D. Sullivan, "Resolute Belief and the Problem of Ob
jectivity," in Rational Faith, pp. 110-139. See also Catechism, ^ 153- ^ 165. Although I
am reluctant to include the claims of faith under the category of things that are prop
erly basic (largely because I want to agree with Sullivan that belief in them, under
ordinary circumstances, is meritorious), I can well imagine one of the great mystics
having, as it were, unimpeachable, non-demonstrative, evidence for supernatural
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Catholicism have in common with respect to the epistemological under
pinnings of theistic belief.
There is not space here to argue for why natural theology and proper
basicality, here blended, can both independently, as well as jointly, es
cape the charge that they make all atheism culpable.64 On Kierkegaard's
behalf, Evans has already argued persuasively that the Dane can escape
the force of this charge.65 Evans uses 1 Samuel 3 to demonstrate how it is
possible to have an encounter with God without knowing that it is God
whom one encounters.66 In that episode, Samuel is being called by God's
voice, but Samuel does not learn that it might indeed be God's voice
until Eli the priest instructs him. Evans goes on to argue that an athe
ist might well have an encounter with God through the experience of
moral conduct. Just as Newman argued that conscience provided a way
for awareness of God, Evans sees Kierkegaard as arguing for something
similar, and in a way that might permit atheists to have this awareness.
Catholic readers of Evans's work will likely note the parallel between
his understanding of conscience in Kierkegaard's famous distinction be
tween the passionate pagan and the nominal Christian (on which, see
CUP, p. 201) and those without an "explicit" knowledge of God in Vati
can II's Lumen Gentium.67
In addition, the Catholic Church of recent years has made it clear that,
while theistic knowledge is available to all, the acquisition of "explicit"
knowledge of God is often hampered by the sins, not just those of the
relevant individual, but also the sins of other individuals and even, in a
certain sense, societies.68 Indeed, Vatican II also insisted that atheism all
too often arises from a well-meaning protest against the evil in the world
and, in some cases, the inadequate Christian credentials of the faithful.69
We read, "Not infrequently atheism is born from a violent protest against
claims of faith. On this latter issue, see John Zeis, "Natural Theology: Reformed?,"
esp. pp. 60-65.
64In a book manuscript I am preparing, of which an expanded version of this
paper forms a chapter, an argument for this claim, with texts from Kierkegaard
and Catholic sources, forms a brief section unto itself.
65Despite the fact that I regard Evans's defense of this point to be successful,
it should at least be admitted that it is altogether easy to acquire the prime facie
impression that Kierkegaard thought all atheism was culpable from passages such
as SUD, p. 95, where Anti-Climacus claims that the reason that one does not un
derstand what is right is that one is unwilling to understand what is right.
66Evans, "Can God Be Hidden and Evident at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian Reflections," pp. 246-247.
67Lumen Gentium, ^ 16. English translations of Vatican II documents can be found
at: http://www.vatican.va /archive /hist_councils /ii_vatican_council /index.htm
68On social sin, see John Paul II, Reconciliation and Penance,% 16. For a translation, I
have used the Vatican translation, available at: http://www.vatican.va /holy_father /
john_paul_ii /apost_exhortations /documents /hf_jp-ii_exh_02121984_reconciliatio
-et-paenitentia_en.html
69John Paul II makes a similar claim about Mahatma Gandhi in Crossing the
Threshold o f Hope, trans. Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee, ed. Vittorio Messori
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), pp. 79-80.
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the evil in the world."70 And also, "believers can thus have more than a
little to do with the rise of atheism."71 The distinction between implicit and
explicit faith is not one that Kierkegaard clearly made, but it does help us
to understand what religious harm individuals can do to others without
necessarily robbing them of their eternal reward.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous attacks on
natural theology's attempts to prove God's existence only go so far. So long
as there is an acceptable epistemological option available to ground our
awareness of the principles that undergird the premises of demonstra
tive arguments, and I have argued that there is, then some demonstrative
arguments may in fact prove God's existence with certainty by natural
reason (so long as natural reason is properly understood). In fact, it has
been argued elsewhere72 that Kierkegaard himself accepts some aspects of
the epistemological picture that would make this possible.
Further, Kierkegaard and the Catholic tradition appear to share a sense
that the knowledge of God's existence should be available to all, indepen
dently of whether these have the acumen for digesting complex demon
strative arguments. There are strong parallels to aspects of Kierkegaard's
work that can be found in Newman's understanding of conscience, and
in Rahneh s notion of transcendental knowledge of God. All of this would
seem to be a natural knowledge quite independent of a particular revela
tion by God.
Kierkegaard and the Catholic tradition can also be mutually reinforc
ing on the issue of non-culpable atheism. There are resources in both for
implicit theism in the face of explicit atheism, especially when consider
ing the voice of moral conscience. In addition, the phenomenon of social
sin in the Catholic tradition may indicate an advance upon Kierkegaard's
thought on this issue, but Kierkegaard's depth in probing human despair
can be helpful in imagining cases of what we might, following Evans, call
"motivated atheism."73 In some cases, the motivation is understandable,
but it is not ultimately, an "excuse."74
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70Gaudium et Spes, ^ 19.
71Ibid.
72I have in mind Evans's work on externalist epistemology and Kierkegaard,
which can be found in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self.
73Evans, "Can God Be Hidden and Evident at the Same Time? Some Kierkegaardian Reflections," p. 246.
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